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Abstract
This paper presents a model of endogenous ﬂuctuations of investment and output
at the business cycles frequencies. Aggregate investments ﬂuctuate endogenously due
to the strategic complementarity of micro-level lumpy investments. The investment
ﬂuctuations are transmitted to the output via variable utilization of capital. Simula-
tions show that there is a range of parameter values under which the model economy
exhibits a large magnitude of ﬂuctuations and comovements in investment and output.
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11 Introduction
This paper presents a real dynamic general equilibrium model without exogenous
shocks and with micro-level non-linearity, and shows that the equilibrium path can
exhibit endogenous ﬂuctuations of investment, output, and consumption at the busi-
ness cycles frequencies.
This research is motivated by the fact that the standard real business cycle models
need to assume large and persistent exogenous productivity shocks. It is still con-
tentious whether such shocks are large and persistent enough as the theory requires
(Cochrane (1994), Cogley and Nason (1995)). Various modiﬁcations are proposed to
amend this problem: propagation mechanisms can render the assumed magnitude of
exogenous shocks small (as discussed in King and Rebelo (1999)), and frictions can
generate the persistent dynamics that resemble business cycles (for example, Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). This paper presents an alternative approach
for the ampliﬁcation mechanism. We claim that the strategic complementarity of ﬁrm-
level lumpy investments can generate aggregate ﬂuctuations even without exogenous
shocks.
In our model, the driving force of the ﬂuctuation is the natural constant depreciation
of capital. It is assumed that the investment is subject to discreteness constraint.
Namely, each ﬁrm cannot adjust the capital level continuously, and it faces a binary
decision whether it invests in a lumpy manner or not at all. If there were a continuum
of ﬁrms, the aggregate dynamics would have a steady state level of capital, and the
lumpiness would be “washed out”. Namely, the fraction of ﬁrms that engage in lumpy
investments times the lumpy investment would be equal to the amount of capital
depreciation. In an economy with large but ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, there will be
a gap between the total investment and the depreciated capital. The law of large
numbers tells us that such a gap is vanishingly small for a large number of ﬁrms. This
2paper shows otherwise under certain environments where the small gap in investment is
ampliﬁed by a strong propagation mechanism. We focus on the propagation that arises
from the strategic complementarity of ﬁrms’ lumpy investments in a monopolistically
competitive economy. In principle, such a propagation mechanism can be mitigated
by the adjustments of ﬂexible factor prices (Thomas (2002)). We quantitatively show
that substantial ﬂuctuations can arise in a version of variable capital utilization model
(Nakajima (2005)) for a range of parameter values.
The model has three ingredients that deviate from the benchmark competitive
general equilibrium model: lumpy investments, monopolistic ﬁrms, and ﬂexible but
predetermined real interest rates. An explanation is due for the last point. The equi-
librium condition of our model boils down to a non-linear dynamical system in very
high dimensions – as many dimensions as the number of ﬁrms. Such a system gen-
erates deterministic complex dynamics for the aggregate variables. Even though the
dynamics is deterministic, it is impossible to compute the exact path for many periods
in future, because a small rounding error leads to a very diﬀerent path of the capital
proﬁle. Thus, the model agents need to adopt some kind of computable forecasting
system. We assume that the interest to be paid in period t+1 is determined in period t
based on the forecasting system the agents employ. In addition to those speciﬁcations,
we assume that a fraction of households follow a rule-of-thumb consumption/labor
decision. This is to enhance the match with the ﬂuctuations patterns of consumption.
We provide an analytical explanation as to why the micro-level lumpy investments
can generate large endogenous ﬂuctuations. The propagation eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s lumpy
investment to the other ﬁrms depends sensitively on the distribution of the ﬁrms within
the inaction band. It is clear that an investment boom occurs if many ﬁrms happen
to be located near the investment threshold. It is not likely that the density near the
threshold ﬂuctuates very much though, because the cross-section distribution within
the inaction band tends to converge to a stationary distribution quickly. We should
3note, however, that a slight diﬀerence in the density is enough to cause a chain-reaction
of lumpy investments. The process is similar to a domino game. Suppose that a tile
that is closest to the threshold falls. If the tile second closest to the threshold stands
near enough to the ﬁrst tile, it will fall, too. The second tile may similarly cause the
third tile to fall, and the familiar domino eﬀect ensues. The falling tiles stop where two
adjacent tiles stand apart a little bit farther than the hight of the tile. Thus, a slight
perturbation on the standing point is suﬃcient to cause a dramatic diﬀerence in the
length of falling times. We will analyze the domino-like eﬀect in our equilibrium model
by investigating a ﬁctitious tatonnement process that characterizes our equilibrium.
The next section introduces the model and equilibrium. Section 3 reports the




The production sector of the model draws on Nakajima (2005). There are N ﬁrms,
each of which produces a diﬀerentiated product denoted by j = 1,2,...,N. Firm j is
a monopolistic producer of good j. Firm j has a within-period production function:
yj,t = Atuj,tkθ
j,t (1)
where uj,t is the capacity utilization rate that j can adjust within period t, and kj,t is
the capital that is predetermined at the beginning of the period t. At is the aggregate
productivity that is common across ﬁrms and grows at constant rate γA.
4The capacity utilization rate uj,t is determined by the labor input hj,t as follows:
uj,t =
hj,t − h
¯ h − h
(2)
This term is interpreted in Nakajima (2005) as follows. ¯ h represents the hours worked
in a day when the production facility is in operation. h is the hours per day that
are needed to maintain the facility when it is out of operation. uj,t is the fraction
of time spent for operation in period t. Thus, the total labor input satisﬁes hj,t =
uj,t¯ h + (1 − uj,t)h. Solving for uj,t, we obtain (2). The term (1 − uj,t)h is the ﬁxed
cost of the production. Due to the ﬁxed cost, the production technology exhibits
some increasing returns. The production function can be expressed as yj,t = (At/(¯ h −
h))(hj,t−h)1−θ(uj,tkj,t)θ. Thus, this speciﬁcation is consistent with the ﬁnding of Basu
and Fernald (1995) when h is small enough.








j,t /N)η/(η−1) is the Dixit-Stiglitz index for aggregate product.




j,t /N)1/(1−η) is normalized to one. We assume
η > 1, θ < 1, and θ(η − 1) < 1.
Finally, ﬁrm j’s investment is restricted to a discrete choice, where the ﬁrm can
choose either no gross investment, an upward jump, or a downward jump of capital by
a lumpiness factor λj:
kj,t+1 ∈ {λj(1 − δ)kj,t, (1 − δ)kj,t, (1 − δ)kj,t/λj} (4)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the capital depreciation rate. Such a discrete choice is observed
when ﬁrms purchase big equipments or adjust the number of plants. The investment
5is denoted by xj,t = kj,t+1 − (1 − δ)kj,t. We assume λj(1 − δ) > 1. The investment is





Firms are owned by forward-looking households and instructed to maximize the







∆t [pj,tyj,t − wthj,t − kj,t+1 + (1 − δ)kj,t] (5)
subject to production function (1,2), demand function (3), and discreteness constraint
(4).






j,t = wt (6)
where
aw ≡ (1 − 1/η)/(¯ h − h). (7)
From (6), we obtain a goods supply function:
yj,t = (awAtkθ
j,t/wt)ηYt (8)
Plugging into the production function (1,2), we obtain a labor demand function:













j,t/wt)η−1Yt − wth − kj,t+1 + (1 − δ)kj,t
i
(10)
6subject to the discreteness constraint (4).




j,t+1/wt+1)η−1Yt+1 + (1 − δ)kj,t+1
i
− ∆tkj,t+1. (11)
The function π is concave by the assumption θ(η −1) < 1. Thus, the optimal strategy
of ﬁrm j is characterized as an (S,s)-type threshold rule in which capital is not adjusted
in t+1 if the depreciated capital (1−δ)kt falls in an inaction region (k∗
j,t+1, λjk∗
j,t+1],
whereas capital is adjusted upward by λj in the region below k∗
j,t+1 and downward
by 1/λj in the region above λjk∗
j,t+1. At the lower threshold k∗
j,t+1, the ﬁrm must
be indiﬀerent between an inaction and an upward adjustment. Note that, if the ﬁrm
postpones the adjustment by one period and if the future adjustment plan is unchanged,
then the capital path coincides with the original path from one period ahead. Thus,
the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent only if π is unchanged by the adjustment for the current period.
Hence k∗
j,t+1 is determined by π(k∗
j,t+1) = π(λjk∗


















j − 1)/(λj − 1)
i1/(1−ρ)
(14)
Rt+1 ≡ ∆t/∆t+1. (15)
7Hence ﬁrm j’s optimal policy is:
kj,t+1 =

     
     
λj(1 − δ)kj,t if (1 − δ)kj,t ≤ k∗
j,t+1,
(1 − δ)kj,t if k∗
j,t+1 < (1 − δ)kj,t ≤ λjk∗
j,t+1,
(1 − δ)kj,t/λj if (1 − δ)kj,t > λjk∗
j,t+1.
(16)
This completes the description of ﬁrm’s optimal behavior.
2.2 Aggregation of ﬁrms’ behaviors







j,t/N)1/ρ. Equation (17) determines the equilibrium wage at the
marginal product of labor given the aggregate capital level. The supply function for
good j reduces to yj,t = (kj,t/Kt)θYt. Aggregating this supply function, we observe
that the aggregate supply is indeterminate within the ﬁrms’ sector. This is because
the within-period production is linear in labor. The equilibrium level of aggregate
production is thus determined by consumption and investment demands.






t+1(Rt+1 − 1 + δ)−1Yt+1
1/(1−ρ)
. (18)
The aggregate labor demand function is obtained by summing the individual de-



















Under the (S,s) rule (16), sj,t takes values in the unit interval. Let zj,t denote the
threshold of sj,t below which the optimal action is to increase capital in the next period
t + 1. That is, if we start from sj,t = zj,t, then sj,t+1 = 0 holds for kj,t+1 = (1 − δ)kj,t.
Thus,
0 = sj,t+1 = (logkj,t+1 − logk∗
j,t+1)/logλj (21)
= (log(1 − δ) + logkj,t − logk∗
j,t+1)/logλj (22)
















logγ + |log(1 − δ)|
(25)
is the natural frequency of capital adjustments for ﬁrm j, where logγ is the trend
growth rate of output and capital.
No ﬁrms adjust capital downward (other than depreciation) when the economy
is around the stationary level, if the lumpiness logλj is suﬃciently larger than the
























































xj,t/N = (1 − δ)
X
{j:sj,t≤zj,t}
(λj − 1)kj,t/N. (29)
2.3 Households
We assume that there are rational households and rule-of-thumb households. (1 − χ)
fraction of households follow a rule-of-thumb on their consumption and labor decision.
Their labor supply is set equal to the average in the economy. Namely, the rule-of-
thumb household’s labor supply follows HROT,t = Ht. They also consume all the wage
income less tax payment, and do not hold any asset. Hence CROT,t = wtHROT,t − Tt
where Tt is the lump-sum tax payment. The other, χ fraction of households are rational,
forward-looking decision makers, and they own the ﬁrms. The rational households have
a momentary utility logCR,t−HR,t and a ﬂow budget constraint CR,t = wtHR,t+Πt/χ−
Tt, where Πt is the proﬁt from ﬁrms. Thus the ﬁrst order condition for contemporaneous
consumption yields:
CR,t = wt. (30)
The rational households discount the future utility by β. In each period t, the
rational households instruct ﬁrms about their marginal rate of intertemporal sub-
stitution, which the ﬁrms use as a discount factor in maximizing their values. If
the rational households know the future states, then the discount factor would be
10Rt+1 = wt+1/(wtβ) = (At+1/At)(Kt+1/Kt)θ. We assume that the rational households
know the realization of the future aggregate productivity At+1, but that they do not
know the realization of the future aggregate capital Kt+1 in t. We consider the case
where households know the current aggregate capital Kt but do not have a precise
information on its conﬁguration across ﬁrms, (kj,t). Then households are assumed
to form an expected aggregate capital Ke
t+1 by approximating (kj,t) by its stationary
counterpart, as we formulate in detail shortly. Thus the discount factor instructed by














The aggregation relation Ct = (1−χ)CROT,t+χCR,t must hold. Combining with the
aggregate labor demand (19) and (30), we obtain the aggregate consumption demand
as a function of wage and income:
Ct = bwwt + (1 − ay)Yt − (1 − χ)Tt (32)
where
bw ≡ χ + (1 − χ)h (33)
ay ≡ 1 − (1 − χ)(1 − 1/η). (34)
Finally, there is a government who collects lump-sum tax Tt and spends the proceed
on purchase of goods Gt. The government’s budget is always balanced: Gt = Tt for
all t. We also assume that the government purchase Gt grows constantly at the same
rate as the trend growth of Yt. Thus, the detrended government purchase is a constant
fraction τ of the steady-state level of the detrended output (¯ Y as we deﬁne shortly).
112.4 Equilibrium
The goods and labor markets must clear at equilibrium. Hence,
Yt = Ct + Xt + Gt (35)
Ht = (1 − χ)HROT,t + χHR,t (36)
where Xt ≡
PN
j=1 xj,t/N is the aggregate investment. HR,t = Ht immediately follows
(36). Combining the market clearing conditions (35) and the consumption function
(32), we obtain:
ayYt = bwwt + Xt + χGt. (37)









ROT,i,t/N)η/(η−1). We assume that the rule-of-thumb households
do minimize cost when they purchase cROT,i,t, just like the rational households do.
Then the derived demand for cR,i,t, cROT,i,t, and xj,i,t are solved given CR,t, CROT,t,
and xj,t. By the usual procedure with Dixit-Stiglitz indices, the market clearing condi-
tions for individual goods aggregate up to the market clearing condition for composite
goods (35). Then, the aggregation of derived demand xi,j,t, (cR,j,t, cROT,j,t) across i’s
and households yields the demand function for individual good j, as we supposed in
(3).
A perfect foresight equilibrium is the price system (pj,t,wt,Rt) and allocation
(Ct,CR,t,CROT,t,cR,i,t,cROT,i,t,Ht,HR,t,HROT,t,hj,t,Kt+1,kj,t+1,Xt,xj,t,xj,i,t,Yt,yj,t,uj,t)
such that the allocation solves the ﬁrm’s optimization problem and the rational house-
hold’s problem under the prices and that the allocation satisﬁes the rules of the gov-
ernment and the rule-of-thumb households and clears the goods and labor markets.
Summarizing the conditions derived above, the perfect foresight equilibrium path is













t+1 = Kt+1 (40)
ayYt = bwwt + Xt + χGt (41)
K
ρ














Xt = (1 − δ)
X
{j:sj,t<zj,t}




















t (Rt − 1 + δ)−1Yt
1/(1−ρ)
(46)
2.5 Approximation of the future equilibrium path
Xt is very sensitive on detailed conﬁgurations of the capital proﬁle kt, as we argue
in Section 4. Due to the lumpiness of investments, the capital dynamics follows a
high-dimensional non-linear system which leads to a chaotic path of the aggregate cap-
ital. Therefore, it is practically impossible for agents to compute the perfect foresight
equilibrium path without employing some approximations to forecast the future equi-
librium path. We assume that the agents approximate the cross-section distribution
of sj,t by a uniform distribution of a continuum of ﬁrms over the unit interval. It
turns out that this is a very good approximation of the actual distribution of sj,t. In
fact, it has been emphasized in the literature that a general one-sided (S,s) economy
13has a robust tendency in which sj,t converges to the uniform distribution (Caplin and
Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1991)).
By replacing (sj,t) with a continuum of uniformly distributed random variables,
(28) is modiﬁed as follows.
K
ρ


















































































































t+1(Rt+1 − 1 + δ)−1Yt+1
ρ/(1−ρ)
(53)
where the expectation is taken across heterogenous λj and aj. In the manipulation,








j = (1 − δ)−1. Then we get:













Similarly, (29) is rewritten as follows under the continuum of uniformly distributed
14sj,t:
Xt = (1 − δ)
X
{j:sj,t<zj,t}
(λj − 1)kj,t/N (56)

































































































ayYt = bwwt + cX(Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt) + χGt. (68)



















The aggregate productivity has a constant growth rate logγA. Thus, the output
has a time trend logγ ≡ logγA/(1 − θ). We normalize variables by the growth factor
and denote them by a hat. Namely, ˆ Kt ≡ Kt/A
1/(1−θ)
t , ˆ wt ≡ wt/A
1/(1−θ)
t , etc. Denote
the steady state values of the detrended variables by an upper bar.








− 1 + δ






t+1 + cX(γ ˆ Kt+2 − (1 − δ) ˆ Kt+1) + χτ ¯ Y

(70)
We further assume that agents form their expectations by log-linearly approximat-
ing the dynamics (70). We denote the deviation of the log detrended variables from the
steady state values by a tilde, such as ˜ Kt = log ˆ Kt − log ¯ K. By a ﬁrst-order log-linear
approximation, (70) becomes:
¯ Rθ( ˜ Kt+1 − ˜ Kt)
¯ R − 1 + δ
+
  ¯ R − 1 + δ








θ ˜ Kt+1 + cX









































Numerical computations show that the coeﬃcient matrix has one eigenvalue greater
than 1 and the other less than 1 for the parameter sets we consider. Thus the dynamics
is determinate. We pick the smaller root ηK < 1 to form the log-linearized expected
16dynamics ˜ K0 = ηK ˜ K.
The approximated equilibrium path solves the system (38–46) where the perfect
foresight condition (40) is replaced with the approximated forecast ˜ Ke
t+1 = ηK ˜ Kt. The
forecasted capital sequence ( ˜ Kt, ˜ Ke
t+1) determines the prices wt and Rt+1, and then
the rest of the system is solved.
Due to the high-dimensional nonlinearity of the capital proﬁle dynamics, there may
be multiple proﬁles of (kj,t+1) that solve the system given the proﬁle (kj,t). We thus
need to specify an equilibrium selection algorithm. We select an equilibrium path
that is the closest to the equilibrium path in the economy with a continuum of ﬁrms.
Namely, we select ˜ Kt+1 that is the closest to the expected aggregate capital ηK ˜ Kt
among all the ˜ Kt+1’s that solve the equation system given (kj,t).
This selection ensures that our estimate of the magnitude of endogenous ﬂuctu-
ations is most conservative, since we choose the least volatile equilibrium path. In
particular, this selection excludes the ﬂuctuations that arise from some informational
coordination among ﬁrms. The selected equilibrium can be reached by a ﬁctitious best
response dynamics in which ﬁrms only need to know the aggregate capital to make
their decisions. Thus, the informational requirement for ﬁrms’ decisions is quite par-
simonious. We argue, along with Cooper (1994), that such parsimony is a desirable
property for an equilibrium selection algorithm to have in macroeconomic analysis, be-
cause it would cost a lot for ﬁrms to collect precise information on the capital proﬁle,
and because it would require an extensive communication for the many, heterogeneous
ﬁrms to coordinate their expectations.
173 Numerical Results
3.1 Calibration
We use steady-state values to calibrate fundamental parameters. Those “great ratios”








− 1 + δ

. (73)




(ay − χτ)aY K − cX(γ − 1 + δ)
1/(1−θ)
. (74)




(ay − χτ)aY K − cX(γ − 1 + δ)
bw
. (75)





a1−ρcX(γ − 1 + δ)
η(γ/β − 1 + δ)
. (76)
Using the steady-steate relation of (19), we obtain the steady-state share of labor
income:
¯ w ¯ H/¯ Y = 1 − 1/η + h ¯ w/¯ Y (77)
= 1 − 1/η + h
(ay − χτ)aY K − cX(γ − 1 + δ)
bwηaρ−1(γ/β − 1 + δ)
. (78)
To calibrate β, we use the steady-state real interest rate ¯ R = γ/β from (31). ¯ R is
set at 1.6% and the trend growth rate γ is set at 0.37% quarterly.
18We match the consumption-output ratio and the investment-output ratio by cali-
brating θ. We set ¯ C/¯ Y = 0.59 and ¯ X/¯ Y = 0.18. In the benchmark model (Speciﬁca-
tions I and II below), we abstract from the government sector, and thus we set τ = 0
and aXY to be ¯ X/( ¯ C + ¯ X) = 0.18/(0.59 + 0.18). The government is incorporated in
Speciﬁcations III and IV, where we set τ = 1 − 0.59 − 0.18 = 0.23.
Labor income share is set at 0.58 and matched by calibrating h. Since aggregate
proﬁts (dividend payments to households) satisfy Πt = Ct − wtHt, the proﬁt share of
output is equal to the consumption share less labor income share. Under the calibration
¯ C/¯ Y = 0.59 and ¯ w ¯ H/¯ Y = 0.58, the proﬁt share is 1%.
The cross-section distribution of the lumpiness parameter λi is matched with the
empirical observations reported in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999). The dis-
tribution shape is ﬁtted well by an exponential distribution. Following Cooper et al.,
we regard λi = 1.2 as the characteristic size of lumpiness. Thus we set the mean of the
distribution at 1.2, its standard deviation at 0.1, and its lower bound at 1.1. N is set
at 350000, which is the number of manufacturing establishments in the US (Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Power (1999)). The capital depreciation rate is set at the standard
0.025 quarterly. The fraction of rational households, χ, is set at 50% in Speciﬁcations
I and III, and at 10% in II and IV. The parameter for the elasticity of substitution η
is freely chosen to adjust the variance of aggregate investment. We set η = 1.57 for I
and II and η = 1.38 for III and IV.
3.2 Simulations
The equilibrium path is simulated for 300 quarters and the ﬁrst 100 quarters are
discarded. The equilibrium path is detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter at the
smoothing parameter 1600, and then equilibrium moments are computed. Each run
is repeated for 30 times to obtain average and standard deviation of the equilibrium
19¯ w ¯ H/¯ Y ¯ R − 1 γ β δ mean λ std λ
0.58 0.016 1.0037 0.9878 0.025 1.2 0.1
Table 1: Calibrated moments
χ τ η aXY θ h
I 0.5 0 1.57 0.2338 0.9225 0.2278
II 0.1 0 1.57 0.2338 0.9225 0.0888
III 0.5 0.23 1.38 0.18 0.9365 0.3670
IV 0.1 0.23 1.38 0.18 0.9365 0.1108
Table 2: Parameter values
moments.
Table 3 summarizes the moment properties of the equilibrium paths. We observe
that endogenous ﬂuctuations of investment, consumption, output, and capacity uti-
lization (hours) occur. The standard deviation of output relative to investment also
roughly matches with the empirical counterpart. Consumption and investment are
strongly procyclical. By comparing across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we observe that a
larger fraction of rule-of-thumb households (smaller χ) leads to a larger standard devi-
ation of output, and an increase in η reduces the ﬂuctuation magnitudes. Fluctuations
of capital and wage are as small as those in the business cycles, while the magnitude
of consumption ﬂuctuations is considerably smaller than data. We observe that the
model generates no autocorrelations.
4 Mechanism of endogenous ﬂuctuations
In this section, we analytically characterize the mechanism of the endogenous ﬂuctu-
ations we observed in the numerical simulations. The analysis here is similar to the
formal analysis of diﬀerent models presented in separate papers (Nirei (2006), Nirei
20ˆ Y ˆ C ˆ X ˆ H ˆ K ˆ W
I (τ = 0, η = 1.57, χ = 0.5)
Std. dev. 0.0107 0.0023 0.0386 0.0070 0.0011 0.0010
(se) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.9534 0.9981 0.9967 -0.4390 -0.4390
(se) (0.0055) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0328) (0.0328)
Autocorr. -0.0617 0.0385 -0.0664 -0.0667 0.4727 0.4727
(se) (0.0717) (0.0722) (0.0716) (0.0715) (0.0508) (0.0508)
II (τ = 0, η = 1.57, χ = 0.1)
Std. dev. 0.0147 0.0060 0.0433 0.0095 0.0012 0.0011
(se) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.9955 0.9989 0.9979 -0.4640 -0.4640
(se) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0389) (0.0389)
Autocorr. -0.0866 -0.0706 -0.0898 -0.0897 0.4556 0.4556
(se) (0.0722) (0.0736) (0.0721) (0.0719) (0.0676) (0.0676)
III (τ = 0.23, η = 1.38, χ = 0.5)
Std. dev. 0.0034 0.0007 0.0169 0.0017 0.0005 0.0005
(se) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.8410 0.9971 0.9936 -0.4259 -0.4259
(se) (0.0105) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0246) (0.0246)
Autocorr. -0.0693 0.2109 -0.0757 -0.0762 0.4750 0.4750
(se) (0.0589) (0.0510) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0396) (0.0396)
IV (τ = 0.23, η = 1.38, χ = 0.1)
Std. dev. 0.0090 0.0035 0.0389 0.0045 0.0011 0.0010
(se) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.9686 0.9971 0.9952 -0.4339 -0.4339
(se) (0.0041) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0367) (0.0367)
Autocorr. -0.0782 0.0010 -0.0850 -0.0851 0.4599 0.4599
(se) (0.0805) (0.0824) (0.0804) (0.0803) (0.0602) (0.0602)
Table 3: Simulated moments
21(2008)). To facilitate the analysis, we introduce a ﬁctitious tatonnement process that
starts from the capital proﬁle (kj,t) and results in (kj,t+1) as follows.
1. Initialize step v = 0 and kj,t+1,0 = kj,t.
2. Given ˆ Kt, ﬁrms predict the next period aggregate capital Kt+1,0 as ˆ Kt+1,0 =
ηK ˆ Kt.
3. Form the adjustment threshold based on the predicted aggregate capital: k∗
j,t+1,v =
(aj/a)Kt+1,v.
4. Adjust capital according to the threshold rule:
kj,t+1,v+1 =

     
     
λj(1 − δ)kj,t+1,v if (1 − δ)kj,t+1,v ≤ k∗
j,t+1,v,
(1 − δ)kj,t+1,v if k∗
j,t+1,v < (1 − δ)kj,t+1,v ≤ λjk∗
j,t+1,v,
(1 − δ)kj,t+1,v/λj if (1 − δ)kj,t+1,v > λjk∗
j,t+1,v.
(79)
5. Stop the procedure if v > 0 and if there were no ﬁrms that adjusted capital
in 4. Equilibrium outcome is Kt+1 = Kt+1,v and kj,t+1 = kj,t+1,v. Other-





j,t+1,v+1/N)1/ρ, and repeat from 3.
We can show that the converged capital proﬁle of the tatonnement process above
coincides with an equilibrium proﬁle which is selected by an alternative equilibrium se-
lection mechanism. The alternative equilibrium selection chooses ˜ Kt+1 closest to ηK ˜ Kt
such that sign( ˆ Kt+1−ηK ˆ Kt) = sign( ˆ Kt+1,0−ηK ˆ Kt). That is, it selects the equilibrium
capital closest to the expected capital in the direction of the initial expectation error.
The ﬂuctuation observed under the alternative equilibrium selection is similar to
that observed previously. Table 4 shows the simulated moments under the alternative
equilibrium selection. We observe that the ﬂuctuations are larger than the previous
simulations, naturally. Other than that, the ﬂuctuation pattern is quite similar to the
22previous one. The alternative selection is closely connected to the original selection,
as the equilibrium selected in the previous section can be achieved by running the new
selection algorithm for the both directions below and above ηK ˜ Kt. In what follows,
we utilize the alternative equilibrium selection in order to characterize the endogenous
ﬂuctuations analytically.
The total capital growth in a period is determined by two components in the ﬁc-
titious tatonnement process: the initial adjustments caused by the initially expected
growth logKe
t+1 − logKt, and the successive adjustments caused by the initial re-
sponses. In the initial step, capitals are depreciated by δ, ﬁrms form expectations for
the aggregate capital next period Ke
t+1, and a fraction of them decide to undertake
lumpy investments. The actual aggregate capital after the initial investment would be
equal to the expected capital if there were a continuum of ﬁrms distributed uniformly
over the inaction band. Since there are only a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, however, there
will be a slight diﬀerence between the actual and the expected. The gap will be ﬁlled
by the successive adjustments in the tatonnement.
We characterize the initial and successive contributions separately and then assess
the total impact. First, we analytically characterize the number of ﬁrms that invest
in the initial step, which we call m1. To facilitate the characterization, we regard the
actual conﬁguration of ﬁrms’ positions in the inaction band as N random draws from
the uniform distribution over the inaction band. Firm i then invests with probability
1/qi at the stationary level of capital ˆ Kt = ¯ K. Then m1 follows the summation of the
Bernoulli trials with probability 1/qi over i. The variance of m1 is
PN
i=1(1 − 1/qi)/qi,
and the variance of m1/N decreases linearly in N.
The size of ﬂuctuation of the successive adjustments is determined by the sensitivity
of k∗, the lower bound of the inaction band, to the aggregate capital K. From (18), we
see that there are two channels of the response: K−ρ and Y . The ﬁrst is the price eﬀect:
an increase in capital raises the real wage and thus reduces the labor demand and the
23ˆ Y ˆ C ˆ X ˆ H ˆ K ˆ W
I (τ = 0, η = 1.57, χ = 0.5)
Std. dev. 0.0120 0.0026 0.0433 0.0079 0.0013 0.0012
(se) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.9518 0.9980 0.9966 -0.4530 -0.4530
(se) (0.0047) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0293) (0.0293)
Autocorr. -0.0167 0.0756 -0.0216 -0.0203 0.4792 0.4792
(se) (0.0633) (0.0638) (0.0629) (0.0631) (0.0468) (0.0468)
II (τ = 0, η = 1.57, χ = 0.1)
Std. dev. 0.0150 0.0061 0.0443 0.0097 0.0013 0.0012
(se) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.9948 0.9986 0.9976 -0.4209 -0.4209
(se) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0366) (0.0366)
Autocorr. -0.1052 -0.0833 -0.1106 -0.1102 0.5062 0.5062
(se) (0.0795) (0.0805) (0.0792) (0.0793) (0.0604) (0.0604)
III (τ = 0.23, η = 1.38, χ = 0.5)
Std. dev. 0.0034 0.0007 0.0170 0.0017 0.0005 0.0005
(se) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.8366 0.9970 0.9935 -0.4267 -0.4267
(se) (0.0161) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0328) (0.0328)
Autocorr. -0.0106 0.2394 -0.0147 -0.0153 0.4841 0.4841
(se) (0.0665) (0.0715) (0.0664) (0.0663) (0.0546) (0.0546)
IV (τ = 0.23, η = 1.38, χ = 0.1)
Std. dev. 0.0082 0.0031 0.0357 0.0041 0.0009 0.0008
(se) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corr. with ˆ Y 1 0.9775 0.9981 0.9967 -0.5267 -0.5267
(se) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0342) (0.0342)
Autocorr. -0.2284 -0.1695 -0.2326 -0.2323 0.3026 0.3026
(se) (0.0615) (0.0645) (0.0615) (0.0611) (0.0531) (0.0531)
Table 4: Simulated moments under the alternative equilibrium selection
24optimal supply. The second is the income eﬀect: an increase in aggregate demand
increases the optimal goods supply. Note that another channel from real interest rate
is shut oﬀ by the assumption of the predetermined interest: the discount rate applied
by ﬁrms has to be decided before the ﬁrms decide investments. By log-linearizing the
aggregate demand function ayYt = bwawAtKθ

















where the ﬁrst term represents the eﬀect through an increase in wage and the second
term shows the eﬀect through future investment.
Then, ηKk ≡ dlogk∗
t/dlogKt = (ηKY − ρ)/(1 − ρ). Thus, the probability that
ﬁrm i is induced to invest by a one-percent increase in aggregate capital is ηKk/logλi.
Also, an increase of logKt by j’s investment is approximately equal to logλj/N when
N is large. In a situation where the heterogeneity in λj is negligible, then, the number
of ﬁrms that are induced to invest by a single ﬁrm’s investment follows a binomial
distribution with probability parameter ηKk/N and population N. Thus, the alter-
native equilibrium selection algorithm can be embedded in a branching process with
the binomial. Namely, the number of ﬁrms who invest in step u + 1 is the binomial
distribution convoluted by the number of ﬁrms who invest in u. The branching process
will stop in a ﬁnite step with probability 1 if the mean of the binomial is less than or
equal to 1 (see Feller (1957)). Thus, for the equilibrium selection to be valid, we need
0 < ηKk ≤ 1.
Suppose that 0 < ηKk ≤ 1 is satisﬁed, and take N to inﬁnity. Then, the equilibrium
selection algorithm asymptotically follows a Poisson branching process: the number of
ﬁrms induced to invest by a single ﬁrm in each step follows a Poisson distribution with
mean ηKk. Let W denote the total number of ﬁrms that are induced to invest in the en-
tire process that starts from one ﬁrm. Let F denote the probability generating function
25of W, and G denote the probability generating function of the Poisson distribution.
Then, for the branching process, a recursive relation F(s) = sG(F(s)) holds. Thus,
E(W) = F0(1) = 1/(1−ηKk) and E(W(W −1)) = F00(1) = ηKk(2−ηKk)/(1−ηKk)3.
The total number of investing ﬁrms is m1 plus m1-convolution of W which we write as
W∗m1. We obtain:
V (m1 + W∗m1) = E(V (m1 + W∗m1 | m1)) + V (E(m1 + W∗m1 | m1)) (81)
= E(|m1|)V (W) + (1 + E(W))2V (m1) (82)
=
p
2V (m1)/πηKk/(1 − ηKk)3 + ((2 − ηKk)/(1 − ηKk))2V (m1) (83)
Suppose that the lumpiness λj is homogenous across ﬁrms. Then V (m1) = N(1 −
1/q)/q. A normalized capital growth rate, N( ˆ Kt+1 − ˆ Kt), is asymptotically equal to
the lumpiness logλ multiplied by the fraction of ﬁrms that invest. Then the variance
of the growth rate V ( ˆ Kt+1 − ˆ Kt) becomes:
(logλ)2
p
2(1 − 1/q)/qπηKk/(1 − ηKk)3N1.5 + ((2 − ηKk)/(1 − ηKk))2(1 − 1/q)/qN

(84)
As N tends to inﬁnity, the second term dominates the ﬁrst term. The second term
declines linearly in N, and thus the law of large number is holding: the aggregate
variance decreases linearly in N.1 When N is ﬁnite, however, the variance can be non-
negligible if ηKk is close to one, because the second term has a square of the inverse
of 1 − ηKk and the ﬁrst term has its cube. Thus, a considerable aggregate ﬂuctuation
may arise for a large N if the strategic complementarity ηKk is close enough to one.
This result is an extension of the research started by Jovanovic (1987) who for-
mulates the idea that idiosyncratic shocks can generate aggregate shocks by a strong
1We can show that the law of large numbers does not hold if ηKk = 1. Namely, the variance of the
aggregate variables does not converge to zero as N tends to inﬁnity. This case is investigated in a separate
paper Nirei (2008).
26multiplier eﬀect. Our result diﬀers from Jovanovic’s in that the multiplier eﬀect is
not constant but depends sensitively on the detailed conﬁguration the capital proﬁle.
Thus, the aggregate ﬂuctuations occur endogenously in our model, while Jovanovic’s
model does not generate ﬂuctuations if there were no exogenous shocks. Our result is
closely connected to Durlauf (1993) who emphasized the eﬀects of detailed states in
high-dimensional nonlinear dynamics.
Note that in (84) the lumpiness logλ aﬀects the standard deviation of the aggregate
growth rate almost linearly (logλ also aﬀects q but its eﬀect is quantitatively negli-
gible). The aggregate ﬂuctuation is further enhanced by the dispersion of λj when
λj is heterogeneous. In that case, the recursive relation of the generating function
F(s) = sG(F(s)) is reinterpreted as G being a generating function of a compound
Poisson distribution. The computation of the variance is possible but tedious (Nirei
(2003)).
Lumpiness is quantitatively important to generate the aggregate ﬂuctuations. We
note that the magnitude of the micro-level ﬂuctuation caused by the lumpiness is
independent of time scale, whereas idiosyncratic quarterly shocks in productivity will
be smaller than annual shocks. Thus, it is natural to guess that the lumpiness aﬀects
the short-run ﬂuctuations whereas the productivity shocks take over in the long run.
It is possible to incorporate the idiosyncratic productivity shocks in our model and
generate the aggregate ﬂuctuations through the same propagation mechanism. Adding
the idiosyncratic shocks would generate even larger aggregate ﬂuctuations, but the
lumpiness will continue to provide an important source of ﬂuctuations in the short
run.
The endogenous ﬂuctuation of capital aﬀects output through investment demand.
Let σ(gK) =
q
V ( ˆ Kt+1 − ˆ Kt) denote the standard deviation of the capital growth
ﬂuctuation. In the benchmark speciﬁcation I, the analytic approximation above gives
σ(gK) = 0.0013. This could generate a large enough ﬂuctuation of investment and
27output, because Y and X are substantially smaller than K in quarterly basis. Note
that ˆ X ' (X− ¯ X)/ ¯ X = (gKK+δ(K− ¯ K))/δ ¯ K. Around the steady state K = ¯ K, σ( ˆ X)
is roughly about σ(gK)/δ, which is equal to 0.052 under the calibrated parameters. This
generates the ﬂuctuation of output σ(ˆ Y ) to be about 0.052 ¯ X/¯ Y = 0.012, provided that
the consumption is ﬁxed. If the consumption comoves with the investment demand,
then the output ﬂuctuation will be even larger.
Given the autonomous investment ﬂuctuations, the relative size of ﬂuctuations of
Y and C are determined from the relations: ayYt = bwwt + Xt + Gt and Ct = bwwt +
(1 − ay)Yt − (1 − χ)Tt. In terms of log-deviation, we have: ay ˜ Yt = bw( ¯ w/¯ Y ) ˜ wt +
( ¯ X/¯ Y ) ˜ Xt. Note that the ﬂuctuation of wage solely arises from capital movements.
Thus, wage and investment have little correlation around the stationary-level capital.
If we neglect the correlation term, then we have V (˜ Y )/V ( ˜ X) approximately equal to
(bwawY /ay)2V ( ˜ w)/V ( ˜ X) + (aXY /ay)2, Also by aCY ˜ Ct = bwawY ˜ wt + (1 − ay)˜ Yt, we
can approximate V ( ˜ C)/V (˜ Y ) by ((1−ay)/aCY )2+(bwawY )2V ( ˜ w)/V (˜ Y ). The relative
variances are observed roughly at V (Y )/V (X) = 1/9 and V (C)/V (Y ) = 0.6 in the
business cycles. These values can be matched if we set ay ≈ 0.5, which requires
η > 2 and to set χ accordingly. In our current calibration, however, we obtain small
ﬂuctuations of investment when η is higher than 2. For the range of η that generates
considerable ﬂuctuations, we obtain reasonable simulated results for V (Y )/V (X), but
a very small number for V (C)/V (Y ).
Simulations show that the model requires a high mark-up rate and a high capital
intensiveness in order to generate the large ﬂuctuations. This is due to the fact that the
ampliﬁcation mechanism relies heavily on the persistence of aggregate capital. When
the aggregate capital is persistent, an increase in investment this period raises the
investment in the next period, which increases the output in the next period and thus
strengthens the incentive to invest in this period. To achieve high ηK, a high value
of θ is required. In order to maintain the labor share under high θ, a high value
28of η is required. This problem might be alleviated by incorporating other eﬀects of
investment on output. For example, investment may aﬀect next period’s consumption
through increased employments. Such an extension is left for future research.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a real dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic com-
petition, variable capacity utilization, and lumpy investments. The model does not
have any exogenous shocks, and yet it is able to generate the aggregate ﬂuctuations
due to the non-linearity that arises from the lumpy investments. In this sense, this pa-
per provides a theory of endogenous ﬂuctuations of the Solow residuals that are taken
exogenous in the standard literature.
Under the standard calibration of ﬁrst moments of aggregate variables, the model
generates aggregate ﬂuctuations of investment and output that are comparable in mag-
nitude to the ﬂuctuations observed at the business cycles frequencies. The comovement
of output, investment, and consumption is also captured well. However, the magni-
tude of consumption ﬂuctuation is smaller than its empirical counterpart. Also, the
model generates no autocorrelations. The calibration used is not quite comparable
with empirical observations on the mark-up rate and capital intensiveness. A possible
extension of the model is suggested to address these problems.
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